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I.    INTRODUCTION 
More than 75 million adults were born during the “Baby Boom”  
years between 1946 and 1964 in the United States alone.1  Over  
the next nineteen years, approximately 10,000 people will retire each  
day from full-time employment.2  Many of these individuals will seek the 
advice of financial institutions and advisors to help with management  
of their retirement assets.  This influx of individuals in need of financial 
advice requires an increased risk of investors receiving advice that is not  
necessarily in their best interest.  The federal government has taken 
proactive steps over the years to protect retirement investors  
through various forms of legislation.3  In April 2016, the Department  
of Labor (DOL) proposed their Fiduciary Rule, which raised the  
standard that those providing financial retirement advice are to be held.4   
 




3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978). 
4. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). 
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While the DOL intended to create a uniform code of conduct among 
financial professionals, the rule was ultimately vacated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.5  In the wake of this decision, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a new standard 
(known as “Regulation Best Interest”)6 that is sure to leave retirement 
investors with the obligation of successfully navigating the state court 
system to seek redress against those who violate the standard. 
This Comment, in Part I, provides an overview of the DOL’s Fiduciary 
Rule, the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest, and the potential impact these 
rules have on consumer litigation claims against financial professionals and 
institutions.  Part II provides a history of the retirement advice industry, 
with a focus on the development of the primary methods of saving for 
retirement, including defined benefit and defined contribution plans, as well 
as accounts falling under the “individual responsibility model.”  Part III 
discusses the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19747 and the 
role preemptive language in the legislation had in attempting to create a 
uniform national standard of conduct for plan fiduciaries.  Part IV 
encompasses a review of the Fiduciary Rule’s key provisions defining the 
new fiduciary standard,8 the Best Interest Contract Exemption,9 and the 
fiduciary contract.  Part V examines not only the impact of the Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruling in Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler,10 whereby the DOL did not create a federal 
private right of action for consumers, but also the vacating of the Fiduciary 
Rule.11  In light of the Fifth Circuit decision, Part VI provides an in-depth 
review of the SEC’s proposed rule, Regulation Best Interest.12  Parts VII 
 
5. Infra Part V. 
6. Infra Part VI. 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 
8. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946. 
9. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
10. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d 
on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018). 
11. See id. at 181, 183 (holding a federal private right of action was not created under the Rule); 
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating 
the lower court decision in Hugler). 
12. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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and VIII provide a discussion of state common law and statutory causes of 
action that may be brought by consumers to recover for breaches of the 
best interest standard. 
II.    HISTORY OF THE RETIREMENT ADVICE INDUSTRY 
A. Growth of the Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and “Individual 
Responsibility Model” 
Planning for retirement has been an important concern in the United 
States since the nation’s founding.13  As a result of the American Civil War, 
a military pension system was developed to help support veterans and their 
families cope with life after service.14  During the Great Depression, the 
United States government enacted Social Security—expanding federal 
retirement benefits to all citizens.15  Following World War II, and in 
conjunction with the post-war boom, Americans started to grasp the 
importance of having a plan for retirement as part of their employee benefit 
packages.16 
The defined benefit plan was the traditional means by which postwar 
Americans saved for their retirement.17  This concept gained in popularity 
during the 1940s, with nearly 25% of private sector workers participating.18  
Under a traditional defined benefit plan arrangement, assets contributed by 
either employers or employees are pooled in a single account, with the 
 
13. See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html [https://perma.cc/KY9J-5Z53] (noting Thomas 
Paine after the Revolutionary War called for a social insurance system to be developed as a means to 
prevent poverty in old-age). 
14. See id. (explaining disabled veterans, widows, and orphans were entitled to government 
benefits). 
15. See id. (describing the development of the Social Security program in the United States). 
16. See JUSTIN OWENS & JOSHUA BARBASH, RUSSELL INVS. RES., DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS: 
A BRIEF HISTORY 3 (2014), https://russellinvestments.com/-/media/files/us/insights/institutions/
defined-benefit/defined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/NC6W-U7NZ] 
(“In 1948, a National Labor Relations Board decision set the stage for a boom in private sector 
pensions plans.  The decision allowed pension benefits to be part of union negotiations . . . .”); Liz 
Davidson, The History of Retirement Benefits, WORKFORCE (June 21, 2016), www.workforce.com/
2016/06/21/the-history-of-retirement-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/CP7K-W73J] (“The idea that 
employees should have some kind of a defined benefit in retirement gained traction during the boom 
decades that followed World War II.”). 
17. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 2 (“[Defined benefit] plans were the retirement 
benefit of choice, covering almost half the private sector workforce in the U.S.”). 
18. See id. at 3 (“Pension coverage (percentage of private sector workers participating in [defined 
benefit] plans) increased from 15% to 25%, and plan contributions tripled in the 1940s alone.”). 
4
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understanding that the employee will be able to receive a fixed income 
payment at retirement.19  Throughout the 1950s, plan participation 
increased to 41% of private sector workers with $57 billion in assets saved.20 
Participation in defined benefit plans remained level for the next two 
decades, especially after the passage of legislative fixes to address problems 
with the plans.21  As popularity waned, a new type of plan, the defined 
contribution plan, became the preferred method of saving for retirement.22  
With the defined contribution framework, employers and employees 
contribute to an account dedicated to the employee.23  The employee is 
subsequently entitled to whatever assets are in the account at retirement.24  
Congress, through a series of amendments to the Revenue Act of 1978, 
created the 401(k) plan—the most commonly used retirement account for 
employees today.25  In the nearly forty years since enactment of the 401(k), 
over $5.1 trillion has accumulated in plans for more than 54 million 
American employees.26 
 
19. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (detailing how defined benefit 
plans function with the employer assuming all investment and funding risk). 
20. OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3. 
21. See id. at 5 (noting 45% participation in 1970 and 46% in 1980).  Compare Colleen E. Medill, 
The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 1, 16 (2000) (explaining the purpose of passing ERISA in 1974 was to address problems with 
defined benefit plans), with Davidson, supra note 16 (observing the Revenue Act of 1978 shifted 
employee focus from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans). 
22. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 5 (“In the first two decades after the passage of 
ERISA, the number of employees covered by [defined contribution] plans tripled, from about 
20 million to over 60 million . . . .”). 
23. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 439.  
24. See id. (“‘[U]nder such plans, by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of funds in 
the plan to cover promised benefits,’ since each beneficiary is entitled to whatever assets are dedicated 
to his individual account.” (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 
(1980))). 
25. The Revenue Act of 1978 detailed three criteria that established the modern day 401(k) plan: 
(1) employers may make contributions on behalf of employees; (2) distribution of plan assets may 
generally occur after reaching fifty-nine and one-half years of age, death, or separation from service; 
and (3) employee rights are nonforfeitable.  Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 
92 Stat. 2763, 2785 (codified at I.R.C. § 401(k)); see also Medill, supra note 21, at 7 (detailing the origins 
of the modern 401(k) plan). 
26. Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plan Research, INV. COMPANY INST., 
https://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [https://perma.cc/27KL-JK86]; see 
also Medill, supra note 21, at 8 (highlighting the rise in the number of 401(k) plans between 1984 and 
1993 from 17,303 to 154,527 respectively, with 23 million American employees participating by 1993). 
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Throughout the 1980s, Congress passed additional legislation allowing 
employees further flexibility in determining how to save for retirement.27  
The availability of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) gave employees 
the freedom to direct their assets to an array of investment options while 
allowing them to have benefits that exist within a consolidated account 
balance.28  The “individual responsibility model,” created through 
congressional legislation, has transferred the responsibility of having a 
working financial knowledge of investments to employees.29  In reality, a 
large percentage of the working population does not possess the knowledge 
necessary to make informed decisions about their retirement savings 
plans.30  Critics suggest this knowledge gap may create a scenario where 
more employees are likely to fail in their retirement plans.31 
 
27. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 states in part, “In the case of an individual, there 
shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the qualified retirement contributions of the 
individual for the taxable year.”  Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 219(a), 
95 Stat. 172, 274; see OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16 (“In 1981, Congress began allowing employees 
to set up Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs—first introduced with ERISA), even if they were 
already covered under an employer-sponsored plan, and expanded Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs).”). 
28. See OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 5 (“Employees liked their discretion over 
investment options, the portability of benefits and the simplicity of benefits being defined as an account 
balance.”). 
29. See Medill, supra note 21, at 16 (“Given the emphasis placed by the individual responsibility 
model[,] . . . it is particularly important for plan participants to be informed of the relative historical 
returns among basic investment options offered in participant-directed plans.”). 
30. According to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), employees should do 
the following when participating in a 401(k) plan: (1) understand the fees paid to the plan; (2) track 
investment performance on a regular basis; (3) review account statements on at least a quarterly basis; 
and (4) seek outside advice whenever necessary.  Managing Your 401(k), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
investors/managing-your-401k [https://perma.cc/2SW2-WWP7]; see Medill, supra note 21, at 15–16 
(noting 55% of employees had moderate financial knowledge and 11% had little to no knowledge); 
Jonas Elmerraji, Retirement Planning: Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.investopedia.com/university/retirement/ [https://perma.cc/YS9E-25JR] (emphasizing 
the importance of understanding asset allocation, how much retirement savings is necessary, and the 
tax implications of participating in a retirement plan). 
31. See Medill, supra note 21, at 14 (“[M]any participants suffer from financial ‘illiteracy.’  As a 
result, they make decisions that place them at risk of failing to accumulate adequate savings for 
retirement.”); David H. Bailey & Jonathan M. Borwein, How Financially Literate is the Investing Public?, 
HUFFPOST (July 29, 2014, 11:16 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-h-bailey/how-
financially-literate-investing-public_b_5625649.html [https://perma.cc/9D32-7ZX3] (“The trouble is, 
most individual investors are not sufficiently well-informed on financial matters, and thus make less-
than-optimal choices in managing their retirement.”); OFFICE OF INV’R. EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, THE 
FACTS ON SAVINGS AND INVESTING: EXCERPTS FROM RECENT POLLS AND STUDIES 
HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL EDUCATION 7 (Apr. 1999), https://www.sec.gov/ 
pdf/report99.pdf [https://perma.cc/P367-VFQF] (“Too many Americans don’t know how to manage 
6
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B. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
The United States witnessed one of its largest declines in investor wealth 
during the 2008 Financial Crisis when 401(k)s and IRAs lost close to 
$2.4 trillion in value.32  In addition, pension accounts—traditionally 
thought of as more conservative in nature—lost between $1 trillion and 
$2 trillion.33  Not only did these losses have immediate impact on 
individuals who invested their retirement savings in the financial markets, 
but they also affected the long-term financial stability of employees.34  
Recognizing a need to address flaws within the financial markets, 
President Barack Obama and Congress sought a fix to better protect 
consumers.35 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 
2010 provided the initial response desired by consumers to protect them 
from financial sales practices that, in part, led to the loss of trillions of dollars 
 
their retirement funds and don’t realize the consequences—such as tax liabilities and other penalties—
of failing to do so.”). 
32. Teresa Ghilarducci, The Recession Hurt Americans’ Retirement Accounts More Than Anybody Knew, 
ATLANTIC, (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/the-recession-
hurt-americans-retirement-accounts-more-than-everyone-thought/410791/ [https://perma.cc/L287-
A2YK]. 
33. Ruth Mantell, Pensions Suffering in Financial Crisis, MKT. WATCH (Oct. 7, 2008, 6:36 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pension-funds-take-1-trillion-hit-in-wake-of-financial-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/HPV4-ET92]. 
34. See Ghilarducci, supra note 32 (“And if current trends continue between 2013 and 2022, the 
number of poor or near-poor will increase by 146[%].  These numbers are unlikely to change as long 
as retirement accounts are exposed to the fluctuations of financial markets and their uneven 
recoveries.”); Mantell, supra note 33 (“Teresa Ghilarducci, an economic-policy analysis professor at the 
New School for Social Research, said there is a long-run retirement crisis, and cited data that about 
half of workers will not have enough income after [sixty-five] to replace 70% of preretirement 
income.”). 
35. During the signing ceremony of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in 2010, President Barack Obama remarked, “Soon after taking office, I proposed a set 
of reforms to empower consumers and investors, to bring the shadowy deals that caused the crisis into 
the light of day, and to put a stop to taxpayer bailouts once and for all.”  Brady Dennis, Obama Signs 
Financial Overhaul Into Law, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072100512.html [https://perma.cc/E9ZV-AZPL]; see 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
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in wealth from “The Great Recession.”36  Within the legislation, Congress 
also established the Consumer Protection Finance Board (CFPB), an 
organization designed to enhance and ensure compliance with federal 
consumer protection laws.37  While the Board was to exist as a separate 
entity from other federal agencies, its creation signaled to investors that the 
federal government was prepared to empower other departments to review 
those regulations impacting consumers of financial products. 
III.    THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) for the purpose of addressing issues over defined benefit plans 
administered by employers.38  The intent behind ERISA was to reform the 
private pension marketplace by protecting workers from poor fiduciary 
practices and underfunded plans that resulted in a loss of benefits.39  
 
36. The opening paragraph of the Act states its purpose: “[t]o promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, . . . to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”  124 Stat. at 1376; see also 
David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summary-
of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/84BC-MGM7] (“The Act seeks to 
mitigate the systemic risk of financial collapse through several legislative and regulatory initiatives . . . 
[t]he Council will be required to meet at least once each quarter and will monitor U.S. financial markets 
in order to identify systemic financial risks . . . .”). 
37. § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2018)).  The Act specifically 
states, “[t]here is established in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau to be known as the 
‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’, which shall regulate the offering and provision of 
consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”  Id. § 1011(a). 
38. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978)., (declaring 
that the purpose of the Act is to protect “the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and 
their beneficiaries”); Medill, supra note 21, at 4 (“Congress enacted ERISA to correct well-publicized 
flaws in the traditional employer-controlled defined benefit plan.”). 
39. Section 2(a) of the Act states: 
[T]hat owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their 
operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for 
the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be 
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans . . . . 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2(a); see also Medill, supra note 21, at 4 (describing 
the issues Congress intended to resolve through implementation of the legislation); ERISA at 40: Four 
Decades of Protecting America’s Employee Benefits, U.S. DEP’T. LAB., https://www.dol.gov/featured/
erisa40/historical [https://perma.cc/9MXQ-67NM] (“ERISA established standards for private sector 
pension, health and other employee benefits, increasing protections for plan participants and their 
families.”); OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3 (“Many pension funds were poorly funded, vesting 
in benefits still took decades (up to 30 years); embezzlement of plan assets were not uncommon.”). 
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Additionally, it placed the Department of Labor in charge of interpreting 
and enforcing provisions that “govern the conduct of plan fiduciaries, the 
investment and protection of plan assets, the reporting and disclosure of 
plan information, and participants’ benefit rights and responsibilities.”40 
ERISA established an important provision for plan participants, the  
right to hold plan fiduciaries liable for breach of a fiduciary duty.41  ERISA 
provides a uniform federal remedy for beneficiaries of any employer 
sponsored plan due to preemption language detailed in section 1132(a).42  
The preemption power stated in section 1132(a) is sweeping in nature,  
as it extends beyond employer-sponsored retirement plans to include  
even insurance benefits offered to employees.43  Congress deemed the 
abuses taking place in the employer benefit plan marketplace to be of such 
national importance that it intended to make ERISA a matter of “federal 
concern,” paving the way for federal courts to hear cases impacted by the  
 
40. Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ 
ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-consumer [https:// 
perma.cc/U28W-UQQ7]. 
41. ERISA’s provision states: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, 
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good 
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from such breach, and to restore to such plan any 
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, 
and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 409(a); see also Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, 
supra note 40 (explaining plan participants have the right to sue fiduciaries for breach of a plan fiduciary 
duty). 
42. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502.  Section 502(e)(1) legislates the 
following right of preemption: “Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section the district 
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this title brought by 
the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.”  Id. § 502(e)(1); see also Aetna Health, Inc. v. 
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200 (2004) (“Because its purpose is to provide a uniform regulatory regime, 
ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, such as ERISA § 502(a)’s integrated enforcement 
mechanism, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation is ‘exclusively a federal 
concern.’” (quoting Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981))); see Milby v. 
MCMC, LLC., 844 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2016) (highlighting the use of ERISA to create “uniform 
national standards for plan administration.” (quoting Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 208)); Young v. Verizon, 
615 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting plan standards ERISA attempted to make uniform). 
43. See Ramirez v Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff’s 
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legislation.44  As a result, ERISA created stability within the pension 
industry by consolidating oversight and regulation under one statutory 
framework.45 
IV.    THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FIDUCIARY RULE 
A. Defining the Fiduciary Standard 
The Department of Labor’s Fiduciary Rule was finalized in April 2016 
and comprised of three separate regulations altering ERISA.46  As written, 
the Fiduciary Rule was designed to address the growing conflict between 
how financial professionals are compensated and the quality of advice 
received by consumers.47 
The Department of Labor believed the lack of disclosure of conflicts of 
interest by financial professionals placed consumers, particularly retirement 
investors, at a significant disadvantage.48  Specifically, the recommendation 
by investment advisors to rollover monies from ERISA-sponsored plans to 
IRAs resulted in retirement investors losing billions of dollars per year in 
fees and investment results.49  Initial definitions within ERISA classified an 
individual who provided advice “on a regular basis” as a “fiduciary.”50  This 
 
44. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 511 (1978)) 
(explaining Congress desired to enforce pension law under federal rather than state regulations). 
45. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (“The policy choices reflected in 
the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be 
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants were free to obtain remedies under state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA.”); cf Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 
1, 25–26 (1983) (holding state causes of action “not of central concern to the federal statute” are not 
necessarily removable to federal court). 
46. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(highlighting the purpose of the rule was to clarify what constitutes a conflict of interest in the 
retirement investment advice industry). 
47. See Thomas C. Graves, DOL Final Fiduciary Rule; Best Interest Contract Exemption or Level Fee 
Fiduciary Exemption from the Perspective of Advisers and Financial Institutions, HAYNES BENEFITS PC, 
http://www.haynesbenefits.com/admin/uploads/DOL%20Final%20Fiduciary%20Rule.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68T4-HE4E] (“The DOL believes that many investment professionals, 
consultants, brokers, insurance agents and other advisers operate within compensation structures that 
are misaligned with their customer’s interests and they often create strong incentives to steer customers 
into particular investment products.”). 
48. See id. (“These conflicts of interest do not always have to be disclosed.”). 
49. Id. 
50. The 1975 definition of a fiduciary developed by the Department of Labor was written as: 
Renders any advice described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section on a regular basis to the plan 
pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, written or otherwise, between 
10
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 8
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss3/8
  
2019] COMMENT 1069 
 
definition narrowed the interpretation as to who may qualify as a fiduciary 
from a legal perspective.51  With a narrower definition in place, financial 
professionals could avoid a fiduciary classification by stating their advice was 
not of an ongoing nature.52  Furthermore, advisors could also claim the 
advice was merely incidental to the service they provided and did not serve 
as the sole motivating factor to the final investment decision by the 
consumer.53 
To address the issue of advice “on a regular basis,” the Department of 
Labor simply dropped this language from its proposed rule change.54  With 
the elimination of the regular basis standard, the concept of a fiduciary 
within the financial services industry has been broadened to include various 
types of advisor-client interactions, including not only ongoing advice but 
one-time transactional interactions as well.  It is this new definition of 
“fiduciary” the financial industry now contests. 
 
such person and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the plan that such services will serve as a 
primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that such person will render 
individualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan regarding 
such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio 
composition, or diversification of plan investments. 
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,842, 50,843 (Oct. 31, 1975) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510 (1975)); see also Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 163 
(N.D. Tex. 2017) (detailing the Department of Labor established a five-part test to determine how an 
individual could qualify as a fiduciary), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed 
Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 6 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Prior to the promulgation of the new rules[,] . . . the 
governing regulations defined a ‘fiduciary,’ in relevant part, as someone who renders investment advice 
‘on a regular basis . . . .’” (first citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21 (2015); then citing 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975–9 
(2015))). 
51. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (D.D.C. 2016) (“As a legal matter, 
the Department asserted that the 1975 regulation had ‘significantly narrow[ed] the plain language of’ 
the statutory definition of a ‘fiduciary.’” (citing Definition of the Term Fiduciary, 75 Fed. Reg 65,263 
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510))). 
52. See Greg Iacurci, How Will the DOL Enforce its Fiduciary Rule?, INV. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016, 
2:07 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160412/FREE/160419977/how-will-the-dol-
enforce-its-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/6J5X-Z3GC] (“Until the Labor Department’s fiduciary 
rule, proving a broker was a fiduciary with an obligation to act in a client’s best interest was difficult—
brokers could easily skirt taking on fiduciary status by claiming their advice wasn’t continuous . . . .”). 
53. See id. (detailing how an investment advisor could avoid a fiduciary responsibility to a client). 
54. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 6 (“The first new rule . . . modifies the 
definition of ‘fiduciary’ by, among other things, dropping the condition that the relevant investment 
advice be provided on a ‘regular basis.’”). 
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in National 
Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez,55 heard one of the first challenges to the 
updated “fiduciary” definition as it related to the annuity industry.56  
National Association for Fixed Annuities claimed an individual providing 
financial advice can only do so on a regular basis, and since their business 
model was focused on one-time transactions, they were exempt from the 
new definition.57  The court found, however, that the act of providing 
investment advice to consumers was a universal act, regardless if it was 
ongoing or one-time.58 
While the case before the district court in National Ass’n for Fixed Annuities 
was one of first impression regarding the Department of Labor Fiduciary 
Rule, its position on the nature of advice appears to be taking hold in other 
federal districts.59  The Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Hugler,60 reiterated that the 
statutory language of ERISA did not suggest investment advice was to be 
only viewed as advice given on a “regular basis.”61  Building on this 
foundation, the court explained advice regarding important financial 
decisions could also include those transactions occurring on a one-time 
basis.62  With its holding in Hugler, the district court established that any 
 
55. Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016). 
56. See id. at 21–22 (claiming the “regular basis” standard for advice must be retained because 
the sale of an annuity contract is a one-time transaction that was never intended to be covered under 
original ERISA language). 
57. See id. at 23 (“As NAFA stresses, for over thirty years the Department used its five-part test 
to determine whether a person ‘renders investment advice’ to a plan or IRA, and . . . that test limited 
the reach of ERISA . . . prohibited transaction rules to those who render advice ‘on a regular basis.’” 
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(c)(1) (2015)). 
58. See id. (stating from a plain reading of the statutory language there is nothing to suggest 
investment advice was only intended to be viewed as ongoing). 
59. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168 (N.D. Tex. 2017) 
(declaring the Department of Labor has authority to define key terms within ERISA), rev’d on other 
grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); see generally Mkt. Synergy Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16CV-4083-
DDC-KGS, 2016 WL 6948061, at *30 (D. Kan. Nov. 28, 2016) (“The DOL has determined that the 
rule changes will benefit retirement investors throughout the United States by requiring investment 
advisers to act in the best interest of those investors.”). 
60. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168 (N.D. Tex. 2017), 
rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); 
61. See id. at 171 (affirming an ongoing relationship is not required for someone to provide 
investment advice under ERISA); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (noting 
the “regular basis” standard is no longer applicable to the current marketplace of financial advice). 
62. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 171 n.64 (“Given that one time transactions such as rollovers 
can be the most important decision an investor makes, such transactions are both meaningful and 
substantial.”). 
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individual who provides retirement advice is now subject to a fiduciary 
standard, regardless of the existence of an ongoing relationship.63 
B. The Best Interest Contract Exemption 
With the development of the Fiduciary Rule, certain transactions effected 
by financial professionals are now considered prohibited unless they qualify 
for relief under the Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE 84–24).64  
Acknowledging financial professionals are compensated through a number 
of methods, such as by fee or commission, PTE 84–24 was designed to 
allow these professionals to continue advising on various financial 
instruments, provided the compensation received was reasonable.65  
Recognizing enhanced regulation could prevent consumers from accessing 




63. See Encino Motorcars, LLC. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Agencies are free to 
change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.” (citing 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005); Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–84 (1984))); Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 
at 175 (stating the definition of a fiduciary under the Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule is within 
“reasonable interpretation under ERISA”). 
64. PTE 84–24 states the following: 
In addition, the Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to grant administrative exemptions 
under ERISA and the Code on an individual or class basis, but only if the Secretary first finds 
that the exemptions are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and their 
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and (3) protective of the rights of the participants 
and beneficiaries of such plans and IRA owners.  Accordingly, while fiduciary advisers may always 
give advice without need of an exemption if they avoid the sorts of conflicts of interest that result 
in prohibited transactions, when they choose to give advice in which they have a financial interest, 
they must rely upon an exemption. 
Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84–24 for Certain 
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, 
and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147, 21,151(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
65. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (“Relief under PTE 84–24 was conditional . . . and that 
‘[t]he combined total of all fees, commissions and other consideration received by the insurance agent 
or broker . . . is not in excess of ‘reasonable compensation’ under ERISA and the Code.” (quoting 
Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84–24 for Certain 
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, 
and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550))). 
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Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE).66 
Under the BICE, those who give advice on retirement-specific accounts 
may be able to receive compensation that would traditionally be prohibited 
under PTE 84–24.67  There are five distinct conditions a provider of advice 
must adhere to in order to qualify for this more stringent exemption.68  
First, any individual or company holding themselves out as an advisor to a 
retirement investor is required to state they are acting in a fiduciary 
capacity.69  Next, the advisor must be governed by an Impartial Conduct 
Standard.70  This standard requires advisors to know their customer with 
respect to their overall investment objectives and financial circumstances, 
while avoiding misleading statements during the advice conversation.71  
Thirdly, the BICE expressly states the need for policies to be in place to 
prevent abuses of the Impartial Conduct Standard.72  Additionally, advisors 
cannot be incentivized to make retirement recommendations that are not in 
their customer’s best interest.73  Finally, all fees and forms of compensation 
must be disclosed to the consumer.74 
C. The Fiduciary Contract 
In order to formalize the fiduciary relationship under the BICE, the 
financial advisor, institution, and client must all enter into a written 
contract.75  The contract must contain language stipulating the five 
 
66. Best Interest Contract Exemption, supra note 9; see generally Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities, 
217 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (highlighting the sale of a commission based product could subject that product 
to the restrictions of PTE 84–24). 
67. See Graves, supra note 47 (explaining the role of the BICE in compensating those who give 
advice to retirement investors). 
68. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (“However, BICE proposed stricter conditions to 
securing an exemption from the prohibited transactions than did PTE 84–24.”). 





74. Id. at 165. 
75. See Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-CV-4083-DDC-KGS, 2016 WL 
6948061, at *4 (D. Kan. Nov. 28, 2016) (“To apply, the BICE would require a ‘Financial Institution’ 
(as defined in the proposed BICE) and the adviser to acknowledge fiduciary status by contract . . . .”); 
NAIFA Fact Sheet: DOL Expands Fiduciary Definition, NAIFA, http://www.naifa.org/NAIFA/media/ 
GovRel/issuefed/NAIFA-DOL-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6M8-KR4U] (outlining the 
necessity of a written contract to satisfy the BICE); see also Graves, supra note 47, at 3 (“An IRA other 
or non-ERISA Plan must enter into an enforceable written contract with the Financial Institution that 
acknowledges fiduciary status for itself and its Advisers.”). 
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conditions for meeting the BICE detailed by the Hugler court.76  For those 
investors who have an existing, ongoing relationship with a financial advisor, 
an amendment to the existing contract is sufficient.77  In addition, the 
financial institution must make express warranties stating the institution is 
in compliance with Impartial Conduct Standards, has procedures in place to 
prevent material conflicts of interest, and does not create special incentives 
for advisors to recommend products not in the best interest of the 
investor.78  While the fiduciary contract is now necessary to memorialize 
the advisor-client relationship, it merely needs to be executed at the time the 
account is opened and not during the initial retirement conversation.79 
Once again, ERISA provides a regulatory framework for employer-
sponsored retirement plans.80  Participants of those plans typically receive 
plan documents detailing the responsibilities of the employee, employer, and 
plan administrators.81  The primary role of the fiduciary contract is to 
provide protection to those participating in IRAs or non-ERISA governed 
retirement accounts.82  While financial advisors do periodically provide 
 
76. See. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 167 (explaining the five conditions of the BICE); see also 
Graves, supra note 47, at 3–6 (discussing language necessary to fulfill contractual requirements); 
NAIFA Fact Sheet, supra note 75 (highlighting contractual requirements to be satisfied under the BICE). 
77. See Graves, supra note 47, at 3 (“An alternative to executing a new contract with an IRA or 
other non-ERISA Plan is to amend an existing contract to include the terms described . . . .”). 
78. See The Final Rule: DOL’s Expanded Definition of Investment Advice Fiduciary Under ERISA and 
Revised Complex of Exemptions, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (Apr. 12, 2016), https://us.eversheds-
sutherland.com/portalresource/DOLFinalRulev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BK4-FP2D] (discussing 
warranties existing within the contract terms); Graves, supra note 47, at 4 (listing three distinct 
warranties that must be present within the contract). 
79. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, supra note 9, at 21,008 (“[T]he exemption does not 
require execution of the contract at the start of Retirement Investors’ conversations with Advisers, as 
long as it is entered into prior to or at the same time as the recommended investment transaction.”). 
80. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1978). 
81. See A Plan Sponsor’s Responsibilities, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-
sponsor/a-plan-sponsors-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/2G4B-2D3L] (noting plan documents 
must remain in compliance with the law); Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/retirement-
plans-and-erisa-consumer [https://perma.cc/U28W-UQQ7] (explaining the purpose of ERISA and 
the minimum amount of information necessary in plan documents to be furnished to consumers). 
82. The Department of Labor stated the following in its purpose for regulatory action: 
If advice is provided to an IRA investor or a non-ERISA plan, the Financial Institution must set 
forth the standards of fiduciary conduct and fair dealing in an enforceable contract with the 
investor.  The contract creates a mechanism for IRA investors to enforce their rights and ensures 
that they will have a remedy for advice that does not honor their best interest.  In this way, the 
15
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advice on ERISA-sponsored plans, they typically work with consumers 
purchasing products in the retail IRA marketplace; thus, the fiduciary 
contract is designed to ensure these retail consumers receive advice that is 
in their best interest.83 
V.    HUGLER, PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION, AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
A. Hugler and the Private Right of Action Question 
One of the primary concerns and sources of confusion derived from the 
BICE is whether a private right of action to enforce federal law has been 
created on behalf of consumers.84  Critics of the rule, mainly those 
representing the financial services industry, claim the fiduciary contract will 
permit consumers to bring breach of contract claims against fiduciaries.85  
It is suggested that if the Fiduciary Rule does create a private right of action, 
then the Department of Labor violated the Supreme Court’s ruling in 




contract gives both the individual adviser and the financial institution a powerful incentive to 
ensure advice is provided in accordance with fiduciary norms, or risk litigation, including class 
litigation, and liability and associated reputational risk. 
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 20,946, 20,947 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
83. See id.(stating under current industry standards there are inadequate protections in place to 
ensure advice received is free from conflicts of interest as most financial advisors are compensated 
through a commission-based system).  
84. See Paul Foley & John Sanders, Fiduciary Rule Creates Breach of Contract Claim, But No Private 
Right of Action, LEXOLOGY (June 12, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9d4d 
cada-155d-43c6-8020-0e74dcd5572c [https://perma.cc/M79Y-EEM2] (“The creation of a private 
right of action is one of the investment industry’s chief concerns with the Fiduciary Rule.”). 
85. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 181 (N.D. Tex. 2017) 
(detailing the plaintiff’s claim that the Best Interest Contract Exemption and PTE 84–24 create a 
private cause of action), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 
(“Industry leaders claim that the BIC exemption creates a private right of action because it enables 
investors to bring breach of contract claims and class actions against the fiduciaries with whom they 
contract.”); see also Nick Thornton, Labor Puts Fiduciary Rule’s Private Right of Action Under  
Microscope, BENEFITS PRO (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.benefitspro.com/2017/03/15/labor-puts-
fiduciary-rules-private-right-of-action?page_all=1&slreturn=1508437981 [https://perma.cc/V7SG-
DF3L] (“The private right-of-action provision prohibits financial service firms and insurance 
companies from writing class-action exclusions into the rule’s Best Interest Contract 
Exemption . . . .”). 
86. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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agencies, may create private rights of action to enforce federal law.87 
The federal district court in Hugler addressed the private right of action 
issue after the United States Chamber of Commerce claimed the Fiduciary 
Rule was in direct conflict with Sandoval.88  According to the court, the 
BICE and PTE 84–24 do nothing more than require written disclosures to 
be added to contracts between consumers and financial institutions seeking 
to qualify for the exemptions.89  Violation of these written disclosures may 
result in breach of contract disputes rather than lawsuits claiming abuse of 
a federal regulation.90  Although state courts typically hear breach of 
contract claims, even a federal court sitting in diversity would have to apply 
state contract law in order to enforce the contract’s provisions.91  
Additionally, for those products used to fund retirement objectives and 
governed by a contract—namely, annuities—the BICE did not change how 
those contracts are enforced.92  The court further stated it is not uncommon 
for regulated businesses that use written contracts to have mandatory 
provisions dictated by federal regulations.93 
 
87. See id. at 286 (holding private rights of action to enforce federal law are created through 
legislative means); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (“The source of 
plaintiffs’ rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which they seek 
to enforce, not in the jurisdiction provision.” (citing Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 
424 (1975))). 
88. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 181. 
89. Id. 
90. See id. (“The consequence may be a lawsuit for non-compliance with the contract, but the 
exemptions do not create a federal cause of action under Title II.”). 
91. See id. at 181–82 (explaining state contract law determines the enforceability of a contract 
regardless if a breach of contract suit is brought in state or federal court); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 
(“The judge reasoned that any lawsuit resulting from the breach of a BIC exemption contract would 
be brought under state contract law rather than federal ERISA law.”); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”).  
92. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (“[B]ICE and the amended PTE 84–24 do not change the 
enforcement regime that existed prior to the current rulemaking.” (footnote omitted)); see also Abbit v. 
ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197–98 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (stating criteria 
necessary to bring a breach of contract claim for an annuity contract under California state law). 
93. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (noting the existing precedent of federal regulations 
determining mandatory contract provisions); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 (“The judge also noted 
that it is not a new concept for federal regulations to require entities to enter into written contracts 
with mandatory provisions . . . and multiple other agencies require that their regulated entities enter 
into written agreements with mandatory terms.”). 
17
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With the Hugler court pronouncing that a private right of action to enforce 
federal law was not created by the Department of Labor, the burden of 
enforcing the Fiduciary Rule dramatically shifted from the federal 
government.94  As contemplated, the Rule did not necessarily provide for 
an administrative enforcement structure.95  While retirement plan 
participants have sufficient remedies available under ERISA, those 
consumers saving for retirement outside of employer-sponsored plans will 
need to seek redress in state court.96  What should concern retirement 
investors is the consistency, or lack thereof, with which the Fiduciary Rule 
will be interpreted under state law.  Depending on the state and its court’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the 
Department of Labor’s desire to create a uniform code of conduct 
throughout the financial services industry may face headwinds.97 
 
94. See Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 184 (holding the Fiduciary Rule does not create a private right 
of action); Foley & Sanders, supra note 84 (“[A]ny claims brought as a result of BIC exemption 
contracts would be brought under state law rather than federal law.”). 
95. See Iacurci, supra note 52 (“The Labor Department isn’t the government agency with 
enforcement jurisdiction over IRAs.  That responsibility falls to the Internal Revenue Service . . . . 
However, the IRS ‘has not been particularly interested or vigilant in enforcement . . . .’”); Nick 
Thornton, Who Will Enforce the DOL Rule?, BENEFITS PRO (June 1, 2016, 4:04 AM), 
https://www.benefitspro.com/2016/06/01/who-will-enforce-the-dol-rule/?page_all=1&slreturn=
20190322155333 [https://perma.cc/WH7T-R6ES] (“Borzi acknowledged what critics of DOL argued 
throughout the regulatory process—‘the DOL does not have direct enforcement authority’ over 
IRAs. . .  That means the BIC exemption will not be enforceable relative to IRAs through statutory 
rules . . . .”). 
96. See Mark Schoeff Jr., Trump Administration Targets Class-Action Right in DOL Fiduciary Rule, but 
Other Legal Avenues Could Remain for Investors, INV. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170831/FREE/170839980/trump-administration-
targets-class-action-right-in-dol-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/W9K8-NH5F] (observing state contract 
law as the appropriate means available for individual retirement account holders to seek remedy against 
investment professionals who violate the fiduciary standard); Thornton, supra note 95 (“Absent the 
statutory authority, the BIC exemptions will have to be enforced through private legal action, or as 
Borzi put it, ‘the consumer has to enforce the rules through state contract actions.’”). 
97. See Schoeff Jr., supra note 96 (according to attorney Joshua Lichtenstein, “[t]he actionable 
claims could differ from state-to-state.  That could mean some behavior is a breach of fiduciary duty 
to an IRA in one state but not in another.”).  Compare Wasserman v. Kay, 14 A.3d 1193, 1219 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“In a claim for monetary damages at law, however, an alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty may give rise to a cause of action, but it does not, standing alone, constitute a cause of 
action.”), with Snyder v. Cowell, No. 08-01-00444-CV, 2003 WL 1849145, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the existence in Texas of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action), and Daugherty v. Ray, No. 01-00-00311-CV, 2002 WL 501592, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] Apr. 4, 2002, no pet.) (“A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in Texas refers to 
unfairness in the contract . . . .”). 
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B. Vacating the Hugler Decision 
Following the election of President Donald Trump in November 2016, 
the financial services industry saw a renewed opportunity to pressure the 
incoming Administration to revoke the Fiduciary Rule.98  On February 3, 
2017, only days before the Hugler decision, President Trump issued a 
memorandum directing the Department of Labor to conduct a full review 
of the Fiduciary Rule and its impact on American investors.99  The directive 
by President Trump did not order the Rule to be revoked in its entirety, 
suggesting the Administration was willing to permit the existing judicial 
challenges taking place to run their course.100  Resultingly, the Presidential 
Memorandum would require the Department of Labor to propose a new 
rule to terminate or revise the existing Obama-era rule.101  Amongst the 
backdrop of lobbying, a Presidential Memorandum, and the federal district 
court ruling upholding the Rule, the United States Chamber of Commerce 
filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
late February 2017.102  
On March 15, 2018, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion on whether the 
 
 
98. See Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, Wall Street Accepts (but Lobbies Against) the Fiduciary  
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/wall-street-accepts-n57982087610/ 
[https://perma.cc/72G4-LW5W] (reflecting how financial firms are working towards compliance with 
the Fiduciary Rule while lobbying against it to the government); see also Jessica Karmasek, Trump 
Administration Sued Over Delay of Fiduciary Rule, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/11/01/trump-administration-sued-over-delay-of-fiduciary-rule/#228 
e43847501 [http://perma.cc/8Y7Z-6V5K] (recalling American Oversight Executive Director Austin 
Evers’ position that “[t]he Department of Labor’s attempts to roll back the . . . fiduciary rules are yet 
additional examples of how the Trump administration has sided with well-connected businesses . . . .”). 
99. See Fiduciary Duty Rule, Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor on the Fiduciary Duty 
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675, 9675 (Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Fiduciary Duty Rule Memorandum] (requiring 
the Department of Labor to examine whether the Fiduciary Rule had and harmful effects on “the 
ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.”). 
100. See Zeke J. Miller & Haley Sweetland Edwards, White House Stalls Obama Administration Rule 
on Retirement Advisors, TIME (Feb. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4659152/donald-trump-fiduciary-rule-
retirement-financial-advisers/ [https://perma.cc/6FQM-PDYA] (“The executive order for the 
regulatory review is largely symbolic, merely directing agencies and the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council to begin a regulatory review process.”). 
101. See Fiduciary Duty Rule Memorandum, supra note 99 (“[I]f you conclude  for any other 
reason after appropriate review that the Fiduciary Duty Rule is inconsistent . . . then you shall publish 
for notice and comment a proposed rule rescinding or revising the Rule . . . .”). 
102. Notice of Appeal, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 
(N.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1476-M). 
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Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule would be permitted to stand.103  In 
short, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Rule in its entirety.104  According to the 
majority opinion, the definition of the word “fiduciary” as used by the 
Department of Labor was in conflict with how Congress envisioned the 
word to be interpreted under section 1002 of ERISA.105  Since Congress 
used the term “fiduciary” within the ERISA legislation, the common law 
definition is presumed to be used.106  However, Congress also added the 
words “to the extent,” which was designed to limit the definition, not 
expand it as the Department of Labor intended to do.107  The court 
suggested that it would defer to the use of words used by Congress in 
enacting the ERISA legislation rather than rely on the subjective 
interpretation of another administrative agency.108 
Of greater consequence within the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the court 
found the Fiduciary Rule to be unreasonable in nature.109  Although several 
of these unreasonable factors are discussed, there are two that will shape the 
future construction of best interest and fiduciary standards.  First, state 
 
103. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 360 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
104. Id. at 363. 
105. According to ERISA, a fiduciary is defined as: 
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan 
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct 
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in 
the administration of such plan.  Such term includes any person designated under 
section 1105(c)(1)(B) of this title. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1978); see U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 885 F.3d at 369 (“We conclude that DOL’s interpretation of an ‘investment advice fiduciary’ 
relies too narrowly on a purely semantic construction of one isolated provision and wrongly 
presupposes that the provision is inherently ambiguous.”). 
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 369–70 (discussing the presumption of the common 
law meaning of the word “fiduciary” when used by Congress). 
107. See id. at 371(“That Congress did not place ‘fiduciary’ in quotation marks indicates 
Congress’s decision that the common law meaning was self-explanatory, and it accordingly addressed 
fiduciary status for ERISA purposes in terms of enumerated functions.” (citing John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1993))); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
510 U.S. at 96–97 (explaining phrases such as “to the extent that” should be viewed as limiting phrases). 
108. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 372–73 (arguing Congress was fully aware of the words 
it used to construct ERISA legislation and could have written the legislation in any manner it saw fit). 
109. Id. at 380. 
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private rights of action were not created by the BICE since only Congress 
may confer that right, agreeing with the Chamber of Commerce’s position 
in the earlier federal district court case in which it argued the Sandoval 
standard should apply.110  The court further reasoned that if the BICE did 
create a state private right of action, then it was nothing more than an 
attempt by the Department of Labor to circumvent Congress’s rulemaking 
authority.111 
The second unreasonable factor of the Fiduciary Rule given by the 
Fifth Circuit was that the Department of Labor ran afoul of the powers 
granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act.112  According to the court, it was indeed Dodd-Frank 
that empowered “the SEC to promulgate enhanced, uniform standards of 
conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers[.]”113  The SEC was 
deemed to be the governing body having greater expertise in regulating the 
financial services industry, with the Department of Labor being in a position 
of supporting any SEC regulatory initiatives.114  Under section 913 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC was granted authority to develop a best interest 
standard as it deems appropriate.115  Remarkably, while the Fifth Circuit 
vacated the Department of Labor’s attempt to institute a fiduciary rule and 
best interest standards for financial professionals, it clearly left open the 
door for the SEC to develop similar standards.116 
 
110. Id. at 384 (“Only Congress may create privately enforceable rights, and agencies are 
empowered only to enforce the rights Congress creates.” (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
291 (2001))). 
111. Id. (claiming statutory authorization is the only means by which a lawsuit could be brought 
in either federal or state court). 
112. See id. at 385 (observing the Fiduciary Rule was the result of the “DOL’s decision to 
outflank two Congressional initiatives to secure further oversight of broker/dealers handling IRA 
investments and the sale of fixed-indexed annuities.”). 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 385–86 (“Rather than infringing on SEC turf, DOL ought to have deferred to 
Congress’s very specific Dodd-Frank delegations and conferred with and supported SEC practices to 
assist IRA and all other individual investors.”). 
115. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-11 (2018)).  According to 
section 913(g)(1), “[T]he Commission may promulgate rules to provide that the standard of care for all 
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers . . . shall be to act in the best interest of the customer . . . .”  Id. 
116. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d at 386 (“DOL’s direct imposition on the delegation to 
SEC is made plain by the text of Dodd-Frank Section 913(g)(2) . . . .”). 
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VI.    THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
REGULATION BEST INTEREST 
A. Overview of Regulation Best Interest 
One month following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Chamber of Commerce, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a rule entitled 
Regulation Best Interest (Regulation BI)117 that would govern the conduct 
of those who provide investment advice to retail consumers.118  In 
developing its proposed rule, the SEC considered the impact the 
Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule would have on investors and the 
financial services industry.119  Regulation BI seeks to address the concerns 
over standards of care among financial professionals by incorporating 
concepts from the Department of Labor’s BICE provision within the 
Fiduciary Rule.120  With the preceding in mind, the SEC appears to be 
responding to the calls of the financial services industry to develop a rule 
that is fair to both consumers and investment professionals alike.121 
Regulation BI seeks to improve on the restrictive language found in the 
Fiduciary Rule while expanding the scope of who and what type of 
 
117. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
118. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,  SEC Proposes to Enhance Protections and 
Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships with Investment Professionals, (Apr. 18, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-68 [https://perma.cc/BU4B-GBJM] (“Under 
proposed Regulation Best Interest, a broker-dealer would be required to act in the best interest of a 
retail customer when making a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy 
involving investment securities to a retail customer.”). 
119. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,583 (“We also considered the regulatory 
landscape applicable to broker-dealers under the Exchange Act and SRO rules and the investor 
protections provided when broker-dealers recommend securities . . . and any differences between 
those protections . . . particularly those that would exist under the DOL Fiduciary Rule . . . .”). 
120. See id. at 21,589 (“We believe that the principles underlying our proposed best interest 
obligation as discussed above, and the specific Disclosure, Care, and Conflict of Interest Obligations 
described in more detail below, generally draw from underlying principles similar to the principles 
underlying the DOL’s best interest standard, as described by the DOL in the BIC Exemption.”); see 
also Mark M. Goldberg, How the SEC Advice Rule Improves on the DOL Fiduciary Rule, INV. NEWS (May 29, 
2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180529/BLOG09/180529924/how-
the-sec-advice-rule-improves-on-the-dol-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/2PGL-4RGU] (stating 
portions of the SEC proposed rule are based on work previously completed by the DOL). 
121. See Rebecca Moore, DOL, SEC Both Have Fiduciary Conduct Standards Slated for Next Year, 
PLAN ADVISER (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.planadviser.com/dol-sec-fiduciary-conduct-standards-
slated-next-year/ [https://perma.cc/9PQN-HCQ8] (“The retirement plan and adviser industry has 
long called for the DOL and SEC to work together on a new fiduciary—or conflict-of-interest rule.”). 
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recommendations should be covered under a best interest standard.122  
Regulation BI, as currently proposed, is designed to hold any individual or 
financial institution who provides investment advice to retail consumers—
regardless of account type—to a heightened standard.123  This standard 
holds the provider to three obligations: 1) disclosure, 2) care, and 3) conflict 
of interest.124  Although Regulation BI imposes these obligations and does 
not directly confer a fiduciary standard on investment professionals, it also 
“does not clearly define ‘best interest’” while still requiring a duty to the 
customer.125  The ambiguity presented within the definition will leave the 
proposed rule subject to interpretation by consumers and eventually 
courts.126 
B. The Disclosure Obligation 
The first obligation under Regulation BI is one of disclosure.  Under the 
disclosure obligation, when an investment professional makes a 
recommendation, they are required to “disclose to the retail customer, in 
writing, the material facts relating to the scope and terms of the relationship 
with the retail customer and all material conflicts of interest associated  
with the recommendation.”127  With respect to “scope and terms of the 
 
122. See PwC Fin. Servs. Reg. Prac., Five Key Points from the SEC’s “Best Interest” Rule Proposal, 
PWC: FIRST TAKE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-
services/publications/assets/pwc-sec-best-interest-rule-proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR2J-DC46] 
(explaining the SEC’s rule will cover all investment recommendations made to retail customers but will 
not yield on restrictions as to how investment professionals are compensated). 
123. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at  21,575.  The proposed rule states: 
That all broker-dealers and natural persons who are associated persons of a broker-dealer (unless 
otherwise indicated, together referred to as ‘‘broker-dealer’’), when making a recommendation of 
any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities to a retail customer, act in 
the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made without placing 
the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer or natural person who is an associated person 
making the recommendation ahead of the interest of the retail customer (‘‘Regulation Best 
Interest’’). 
Id. 
124. Id. at 21,585. 
125. See PwC Fin. Servs. Reg. Prac., supra note 122, (noting Regulation BI provides little to no 
explanation as to the meaning of “best interest”). 
126. See id. (“While many broker-dealers may be pleased with the limited changes, retail 
customers may face more confusion than clarity without an explicitly defined standard.”). 
127. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,599. 
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relationship,” the SEC envisions a policy where broker-dealers disclose to 
the customer the capacity in which the investment professional is making a 
recommendation.  In furthering this vision, a requirement exists that seeks 
to explain all costs associated not only to the recommendation but also to 
the accounts held by the customer with the broker-dealer.128  Finally, under 
this proposition, the broker-dealer is required to disclose the nature of the 
services provided on the investment account, such as whether ongoing 
monitoring of investment performance is taking place.129 
Within the disclosure obligation is the requirement that all disclosures be 
made to the consumer in writing in an attempt to reduce investor 
confusion.130  The writing, also known as the “Relationship Summary,” 
would detail all the information necessary for an investor to have in making 
a decision about working with the financial institution.131  This information 
includes “the services, fees, conflicts, and disciplinary history of firms and 
financial professionals they are considering, along with references and links 
to other disclosure where interested investors can find more detailed 
information.”132  Of note is the requirement to deliver the writing at the 
time the consumer either enters into an investment advisory agreement or 
when first utilizing a broker-dealer’s services.133  While the SEC does not 
explicitly call the writing a contract, if it is incorporated as part of an 
investment advisory agreement or is a condition of engaging a customer in 
a financial relationship, it does leave to question whether it could be 
considered an enforceable agreement between two parties.  Furthermore, 
the silence within Regulation Best Interest on this issue leads to the 
possibility that a breach of the writing could be contested in a court of law. 
C. The Care Obligation 
The second obligation proposed under Regulation BI is the care 
obligation.134  Within this obligation resides an expectation that financial 
professionals will “exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence” 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id.  
130. See id. at 21,600 (“This Disclosure Obligation also forms an important part of a broader 
effort to address retail investor confusion . . . .”). 
131. See id. (detailing the overriding purpose of the Relationship Summary). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 21,608. 
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when making investment recommendations.135  These expectations apply 
to three distinct areas of the recommendation process.  First, the investment 
professional must reasonably believe that based on a risk–and–reward 
analysis, a recommendation that is in the best interest for a particular 
segment of clients is being made.136  Second, using an investment profile 
for the specific customer, the professional must reasonably believe the 
recommendation is in the best interest of said customer.137  Finally, there 
must be a reasonable basis to conclude that a series of recommendations is 
not excessive and is in the customer’s best interest.138 
Notably, the SEC appears to pay deference to the Impartial Conduct 
Standard under the Fiduciary Rule in crafting language for the care 
obligation.139  The SEC interpreted the BICE within the Department of 
Labor rule to apply a standard of care requiring investment-advice 
fiduciaries to conduct themselves as impartial professionals.140  
Furthermore, the SEC stated—regarding the BICE—that “[t]he fiduciary 
must adhere to an objective professional standard and is subject to a 
particularly stringent standard of prudence when they have a conflict of 
interest.”141  The influence of the Fiduciary Rule language is apparent when 
the SEC explains the “proposed Care Obligation establishes an objective, 
professional standard of conduct for broker-dealers that requires broker-
dealers to ‘exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill and prudence[.]’”142  
One can infer the SEC is tying the care obligation directly to the duties set 
forth under the Fiduciary Rule.  This nearly duplicative language by the SEC 
clearly suggests that if a financial professional violates the standard of care 
they are in danger of breach of a fiduciary duty to the customer. 
 
135. Id. 
136. See id. (suggesting recommendations should be generally accepted amongst a larger group 
of investors). 
137. See id. (explaining the reasonable basis determination for an individual investor is 
dependent on an investment profile). 
138. See id. (noting investment professionals have an obligation to ensure that a series of 
transactions are not excessive in nature). 
139. See id. at 21,614 (“[W]e believe the proposed Care Obligation generally reflects similar 
underlying principles as the ‘objective standards of care’ that are incorporated in the best interest 
Impartial Conduct Standard as set forth by the DOL in the BIC Exemption.”). 
140. See id. (providing the SEC’s interpretation into the DOL’s meaning of standard of care). 
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D. The Conflict of Interest Obligation 
The final obligation under Regulation BI is the conflict of interest 
obligation.  There are two requirements to the obligation that apply directly 
to financial institutions.143  First, the company must maintain written 
policies and procedures disclosing material conflicts of interest as they relate 
to the recommendations being made to customers.144  Second, financial 
companies must disclose any financial incentives resulting from the sale of 
a recommendation.145  The conflict of interest obligation does appear to be 
the most flexible of the three as it permits financial institutions to make their 
own decision on which conflicts of interest to disclose.146  In addition, the 
SEC is encouraging broker-dealers to develop compliance systems that fit 
within their own business model.147 
E. Pathway to Litigating Violations of Regulation Best Interest in State Court 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 granted federal courts 
jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Act.148  Indeed, since inception 
of the legislation, courts have ruled  consistently that suit for violations 
under the Act are subject to federal court jurisdiction.149  However, 
 
143. Id. at 21,617. 
144. See id. (describing what is necessary to have a fully compliant company policy on conflicts 
of interest). 
145. See id. (“[E]stablish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to identify, and disclose and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from 
financial incentives associated with such recommendations.”). 
146. See id. (stating broker-dealers will “be permitted to exercise their judgment” on whether to 
disclose a conflict of interest).  
147. See id. at 21,618 (“Use of a risk-based compliance and supervisory system would grant 
broker-dealers the flexibility to establish systems that are tailored to their business models . . . .”). 
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010).  The Code reads in part: 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other 
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations 
of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law 
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder.   
Id. 
149. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 
1998) (declaring federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enforce the Act); Hawkins v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Sec. Dealers, 149 F.3d 330, 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining federal courts have “broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the arena of securities regulation”); Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 
1313 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing provision within the Act that grants federal jurisdiction over violations of 
the Act). 
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following the announcement of Regulation BI, state governments have 
criticized the proposed rule as not going far enough to protect its 
citizens.150  As of August 2018, sixteen states including the District of 
Columbia commented on the deficiencies within the proposed rule.151  
Although it remains to be seen whether states will enact their own best 
interest standards, the displeasure amongst state attorneys general indicates 
potential state challenges—to the SEC’s rulemaking authority and best 
interest standards—should be handled on a state-by-state basis.152 
Should direct state challenges to Regulation BI prove to be unsuccessful, 
the United States Supreme Court in its 2016 decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning153 may provide an alternative means for states 
to protect consumers with respect to the SEC rule.154  In Manning, Greg 
Manning brought suit against Merrill Lynch in New Jersey state court 
alleging the investment company purposefully devalued the share price of a 
NASDAQ traded stock resulting in significant losses for Manning.155  
Although Manning cited violations of federal law in his complaint, he also 
sought to make claims that Merrill Lynch violated New Jersey state law.156  
Merrill Lynch had the case removed to federal court district court, which 
ultimately denied Manning’s motion to move the case back to state court.157  
Manning argued that even though he brought state-based claims alleging 
violations of a federal statute, those claims should be heard in state court.158  
The Supreme Court agreed with Manning, holding that state-based claims 
are not subject to removal to federal court simple because they reference a 
 
150. See Fiduciary Governance: A Fiduciary’s 2018 Retrospective (and Predictions for 2019), STRADLEY 
RONON: RISK&REWARD 2 (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.stradley.com/-/media/files/publications/
2019/01/risk_and_reward_jan7_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA3P-BCHH] (signaling the desire of 
the State of Massachusetts to develop its own fiduciary standard in light of the SEC’s proposed rule). 
151. See id. at 8 (showing a significant number of states do not believe Regulation BI will 
sufficiently protect their citizens). 
152. See id. at 9 (“While regulations may face better odds than legislation, they also remain 
vulnerable to court challenge that the regulator acted beyond its powers.”). 
153. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016). 
154. See id. (holding state court had proper jurisdiction over Manning’s claims against an 
investment company). 
155. Id. at 1566. 
156. Id. at 1566–67. 
157. Id. at 1567. 
158. Id. at 1569. 
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violation of federal statute.159  As a result of the Manning decision, a 
possibility now exists for consumers to bring causes of action such as breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and other state-based deceptive trade 
practices claims against Regulation BI in state courts without fear of removal 
over a federal jurisdictional question. 
VII.    LITIGATING VIOLATIONS OF REGULATION BEST INTEREST 
UNDER STATE COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Breach of Contract 
Since the Hugler court suggested the breach of a fiduciary agreement 
between a retirement investor and advisor amounts to no more than a 
breach of contract, the investor would need to bring a common law cause 
of action in state court.160  In a breach of contract cause of action, the 
plaintiff maintains the burden of proving (1) that a valid contract did exist 
between the parties, (2) there was performance of the contract on behalf of 
the plaintiff, (3) a breach occurred by the defendant, and (4) the plaintiff 
incurred damages.161  State courts have universally recognized these 
elements in breach of contract cases.162  Considering the intent of ERISA, 
the Fiduciary Rule, and Regulation BI was to create a uniform code of 
conduct in the financial services industry and standardize the means of 
recovery for aggrieved investors, the acceptance of these breach of contract 
elements may aid the SEC in reaching its stated objectives. 
 
159. See id. at 1574 (“[W]e will not lightly read the statute to alter the usual constitutional 
balance, as it would by sending actions with all state-law claims to federal court just because a complaint 
references a federal duty.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein , 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996) 
(“While § 27 prohibits state courts from adjudicating claims arising under the Exchange Act, it does 
not prohibit state courts from approving the release of Exchange Act claims in the settlement of suits 
over which they have properly exercised jurisdiction . . . .”). 
160. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 181–82 (N.D. Tex. 
2017), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 360 (2018). 
161. Abbit v. ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
162. See id. (recognizing the four elements of a breach of contract cause of action in California); 
Smith v. Jones, 497 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ill. 1986) (highlighting four elements a plaintiff must prove for 
breach of contract in Illinois); Kronos, Inc., v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. 1993) (noting 
four elements to a New York breach of contract cause of action); Hussong v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., 
Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding there are four main 
elements to breach of contract cases in Texas).  But see J.J. Gumberg Co. v. Janis Servs., 847 So. 2d 
1048, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (stating a breach of contract cause of action in Florida has three 
elements consisting of: 1) the existence of a contract; 2) breach; and 3) damages). 
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While Regulation BI creates predictability for consumers by holding 
retirement advisors to potential contractual obligations, it may also establish 
a limiting effect for the amount of damages a plaintiff receives.  Under the 
common law, plaintiffs in breach of contract cases may recover actual 
damages.163  Those damages necessarily arise as a result of the conduct of 
the defendant.164  In the case of retirement accounts, damages resulting 
from the conduct of a financial advisor are those attributable to investment 
loss as a result of poor advice.  For higher net worth investors these dollar 
amounts could be substantial; however, smaller account holders would more 
likely not be in a position to litigate their claims, as the damage sought is 
typically less than the cost associated with litigation.165  In addition, breach 
of contract causes of action generally do not allow for the award of punitive 
damages.166  Once again, small investors will find themselves in a position 
where they will pay more in litigation costs than damages received, all while 
attempting to convince attorneys to work on their behalf where there is little 
incentive to do so.167 
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
If Regulation BI imposes a fiduciary obligation on behalf of financial 
professionals, and the Manning court places the responsibility to hear cases 
in which the proposed rule has been violated at the state level, one could 
expect consumers to bring common law breach of fiduciary duty causes of 
action.  Like breach of contract, a breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff 
to prove a number of elements.168  For a claimant to recover, it must be 
shown that (1) both the plaintiff and defendant had a fiduciary relationship, 
(2) the relationship was breached by the defendant, and (3) damages 
 
163. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2006). 
164. See Mead v. Johnson Grp., Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 1981) (“In an action for breach 
of contract, actual damages may be recovered when loss is the natural, probable, and foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”) 
165. See John L. Hill, Introduction, 8 ST. MARY’S L.J. 609, 610 (1977) (noting the remedies 
available to consumers are limited by contract clauses written by corporations and the high costs of 
bringing breach of contract claims to court under an unconscionability standard). 
166. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986). 
167. But see Hill, supra note 165, at 614 (“[T]he new DTPA addressed the second hurdle—the 
disincentive to litigate arising from the imbalance between the high cost and practical difficulties of 
litigation and the small ‘actual’ damages characteristic of most consumer claims.”). 
168. Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet denied). 
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occurred as a result of the breach.169  Once again, most states have 
universally accepted these elements.170 
Although there is agreement on what constitutes a breach of fiduciary 
duty cause of action amongst state courts, there is a split as to whether those 
who provide financial advice actually have a fiduciary duty.171  The Texas 
Court of Appeals, in Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben,172 is 
particularly instructive as to how Texas courts should consider these types 
of cases.173  Timothy Hutton was a financial advisor who was licensed to 
sell products with Intersecurities.174  He was approached by David Graben, 
a retired American Airlines pilot, in 1999 to discuss the possibility of 
managing Graben’s retirement assets.175  After conducting a financial 
interview with Graben, Hutton invested $2.5 million of Graben’s assets in a 
variable annuity with Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of 
Ohio.176  Hutton earned a commission on the sale and held himself out as 
the individual who would monitor the performance of the account on behalf 
of Graben.177  Over a five-year period, the investment earned 
approximately 1% per year.178  Frank Strickler, another retired American 
Airlines pilot who worked with and experienced a similar outcome in his 
relationship with Hutton, also joined the suit.179  Graben and Strickler 
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty based on the advice they received from 
 
169. Id.; see also Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 
pet denied) (detailing three distinct elements for a breach of fiduciary duty claim (citing Blume, 
196 S.W.3d 440)). 
170. See Baker v. Family Credit Counseling Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392, 414–15 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(listing the elements for breach of fiduciary duty in Pennsylvania); Oasis W. Realty, LLC., v. Goldman, 
250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011) (highlighting elements for breach of fiduciary duty in California); 
Lawlor v. N. Amendment Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 433 (Ill. 2012) (outlining breach of fiduciary 
duty elements in Illinois); Blume,196 S.W.3d at 447 (explaining Texas breach of fiduciary duty elements).  
But see Rendahl v. Peluso, 162 A.3d 1, 22 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017) (noting there are four elements to a 
breach of fiduciary duty case in Connecticut). 
171. Compare W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360, 373–74 
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (finding the existence of a fiduciary duty by an individual who 
provides financial advice in Texas), with Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 548 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (finding financial advice did not create a fiduciary relationship in Alabama). 
172. W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 2007, no pet.). 
173. See id. at 373–74 (discussing when financial advice creates a fiduciary duty). 
174. Id. at 363–64. 
175. Id. at 364. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 365. 
178. Id. at 366. 
179. Id. at 366–67. 
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Hutton.180  The court found that unsophisticated investors who trust those 
to make appropriate investments on their behalf create more than an arm’s-
length transaction.181  Furthermore, those who hold themselves out as 
financial advisors have a duty to continuously review client accounts and to 
assume the role of a fiduciary.182 
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, in Production Credit Ass’n v. Croft,183 
took a slightly different approach than the Texas courts as to whether 
financial advice confers a fiduciary duty on an individual.184  Roger Croft, 
who operated a farm, sought a loan with Production Credit Association 
(PCA) in 1980.185  He applied for additional loans in 1983 and 1984 to help 
pay for costs associated with operating his farm.186  When PCA moved to 
foreclose on real estate mortgages used to secure the 1984 loans, Croft filed 
a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty.187  He maintained that 
because he was a farmer he lacked the knowledge and sophistication 
required to make a sound lending decision, forcing him to rely on PCA for 
guidance.188  While the court acknowledged a fiduciary duty can be created 
by contract, the mere existence of the contract does not establish a fiduciary 
duty.189  Of greater consequence is the court’s analysis of when a fiduciary 
duty is implied in law.190  The court may consider a number of factors, 
including age, education, and business experience, to determine whether an 
individual seeking financial advice is in a subservient position to whomever 
 
180. Id. at 368. 
181. See id. at 374 (“The relationship goes well beyond a traditional arms’-length business 
transaction that provides ‘mutual benefit’ for both parties.”). 
182. See id. (“Simply put, when Hutton assumes the role to act as a financial advisor to the 
Clients and to monitor and manage their investments, any arms’-length business transaction that may 
have existed between the parties was elevated by the very nature of Hutton’s actions.”). 
183. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). 
184. See id. at 549 (holding there was no fiduciary duty created when financial advice was given). 
185. Id. at 545. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 546. 
189. See id. at 546–47 (explaining the terms and obligations of the parties within the contract 
will determine whether a fiduciary duty has been established). 
190. See id. at 547 (“A fiduciary relationship arises from a formal commitment to act for the 
benefit of another . . . or from special circumstance from which the law will assume an obligation to 
act for another’s benefit.” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Boeck, 377 N.W.2d 
605 (Wis. 1985))). 
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is providing the advice.191  As this decision relates to the Department of 
Labor Fiduciary Rule, investors may not be able to rely solely on the 
argument that their lack of education on investments automatically creates 
a fiduciary duty on behalf of their financial advisor.192 
VIII.    DO STATE STATUTORY SCHEMES PROVIDE CONSUMER RELIEF? 
A. Advantages of a State Statutory Cause of Action 
A number of states have adopted statutory frameworks to address the 
issue of deceptive trade practices committed against consumers.193  
Considering the intent of Regulation BI is to curb improper sales practices 
within the retirement-advice industry, these statutory provisions may 
provide a better alternative for consumers to seek relief.194  While common 
law theories of recovery typically entail plaintiffs proving multiple elements, 
such as intent and reliance, deceptive trade practice statutes provide 
consumers with more favorable treatment by courts in eliminating these 
requirements.195  Those seeking to bring suit for violations of Regulation 
 
191. See id. (stating the criteria that a court may use to determine the existence of a subservient 
position). 
192. See id. at 548 (“Debtors should not be allowed to rely blindly on advice given by a lender 
and hold the lender responsible for its losses if the advice, with the benefit of hindsight, is not 
appropriate.” (quoting Steven C. Bahls, Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender 
Liability, 48 MONT. L. REV. 213 (1987))); Boeck, 377 N.W.2d at 609 (“A fiduciary relationship does not 
arise merely because a broker offers advice and counsel upon which a customer has a right to place 
trust and confidence.”). 
193. See Amy Algiers Anderson, Note, State Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Acts: 
Should Wisconsin Lawyers Be Susceptible to Liability under Section 100.20?, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1999) 
(highlighting the various states who have enacted statutes addressing the problem of deceptive trade 
practices); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017) (“As used in this chapter, unfair 
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and 
unfair, deceptive, and untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 349 (McKinney 2017) 
(“Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing 
of any service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) 
(“False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby 
declared unlawful and are subject to action by the consumer protection division . . . .”). 
194. See Anderson, supra note 193, at 497 (“Although these statues vary from state to state and 
may be modeled after different federal acts, they all have the same basic purpose—to protect the public 
from unfair or deceptive acts or practices with respect to the sale of goods or services.”). 
195. Compare Michael C. Gilleran, The Rise of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act Claims, A.B.A. 
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/fall2011-
unfair-deceptive-trade-practice-act-claims.html [https://perma.cc/BXB8-SHKS] (noting common law 
causes of action, such as fraud, generally require “intent to deceive and proof of reliance” to be shown 
by plaintiffs), with Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (“By extending to the consumer the same cause of action 
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BI using a statutory framework would not be required to prove a financial 
professional intended to deceive, but rather only need to show that the 
advisor had the capacity to deceive.196  The obligations of disclosure, care, 
and conflicts of interest under Regulation BI could provide the backdrop 
for a successful consumer lawsuit, as any perceived violation of those 
obligations, regardless of whether an actual deceptive act occurred, would 
be subject to a claim.197 
The ability to collect increased damage amounts also makes a lawsuit 
under a deceptive trade practices act cause of action more attractive to 
investors.  State statutory models typically allow a consumer to create a 
multiplier effect, known as treble damages, when calculating damages owed 
for a claim.198  Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff 
can recover up to three times the economic damages incurred for a knowing 
violation committed by a defendant.199  For a financial advisor or 
institution, the prospect of increased economic or punitive damages creates 
a powerful incentive to settle claims with investors and prevent future cases 
 
for deceptive practices formerly available only to the attorney general, the DTPA substantially lightened 
the burden of proof required of the consumer in common law actions for fraud.”). 
196. See Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (explaining capacity and tendency replace the requirement 
of intent as necessary elements to a deceptive trade practice cause of action); Gilleran, supra note 195 
(“Moreover, the representation does not have to be literally false; all that has to be shown is that the 
representation was likely to deceive, or even that it just has the capacity or tendency to deceive.”). 
197. See Hill, supra note 165, at 613 (“If the conduct could mislead the ‘ignorant, the unthinking 
and the credulous,’ it violates the law.”); see also Gilleran, supra note 195 (“For example, UDTPAs 
expand liability to include unfair conduct . . . . and often causes courts to characterize UDTPAs as 
‘statute[s] of broad impact which create[ ] new substantive rights’ and as ‘making conduct unlawful 
which was not unlawful under the common law or any prior statute.’” (alterations in original)). 
198. See Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(highlighting “the extraordinary damages authorized by the UTPA” in North Carolina); Kenai Chrysler 
Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1259 (Alaska 2007) (noting under Alaska statute prevailing 
plaintiffs are entitled to three times actual damages); PPG Indus. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. 
P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Tex. 2004) (explaining the Texas DTPA provides for treble damages); 
Gilleran, supra note 195 (“They provide for an award of either a multiple of actual damages, or 
unlimited punitive damages, to a prevailing plaintiff.”). 
199. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50.  Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
Relief for Consumers provision “[i]f the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was 
committed knowingly, the consumer may also recover damages for mental anguish, as found by the 
trier of fact, and the trier of fact may award not more than three times the amount of economic 
damage[.]”  Id. § 17.50(b)(1); see also Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 
2006) (holding plaintiff could recover three times economic damages for a DTPA violation). 
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of abuse.200  Furthermore, these damage awards would disincentive 
financial companies from engaging in material conflicts of interest, knowing 
the costs of doing so outweigh any perceived benefit.  In the end, the 
awarding of damages under a deceptive trade practice statutory framework 
assists the SEC in achieving its goals under Regulation BI.201 
Many states with deceptive trade practice statutory frameworks allow for 
the collection of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff.202  Common law 
causes of action, with the exception of breach of contract, typically do not 
permit plaintiffs to be paid attorney’s fees by losing defendants.203  On the 
other hand, the awarding of attorney’s fees are in many instances deemed to 
be mandatory.204  Similar to treble damages, allowing plaintiffs to collect 
attorney’s fees provides an incentive for attorneys to litigate cases where a 
violation of the Fiduciary Rule has occurred, especially those involving 
smaller dollar amounts.205 
B. Proving Consumer Status 
Although suits brought under a statutory cause of action provide fewer 
hurdles for retirement investors to overcome in litigating their claims, there 
are issues that should give consumers pause for concern.  A common 
element that must be shown by plaintiffs in deceptive trade practice theories 
of recovery is whether the plaintiff is considered a consumer under a 
 
200. See Gilleran, supra note 195 (reviewing the intent of multiple and punitive damage awards 
under state deceptive trade practice statutes); see also Denison, 167 P.3d at 1260 (“The legislative history 
of Alaska’s provision establishes that treble damages were adopted not just to deter fraud, but also to 
encourage injured parties to file suits under the UTPA and to ensure that they would be adequately 
compensated for their efforts.”). 
201. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,617 (May 9, 2018) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing the intent behind the Conflict of Interest Obligation). 
202. Gilleran, supra note 195. 
203. See Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 311 (“Absent a contract or statute, trial courts do not 
have inherent authority to require a losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.” (citing Travelers 
Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding))); Gilleran, supra 
note 195 (discussing the “American Rule” in which plaintiffs could not collect attorney’s fees and were 
ultimately responsible for paying their own fees). 
204. See TEX. BUS. & COM. § 17.50(d) (“Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court 
costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.”); see also Gilleran, supra note 195 (citing state case 
law where the award of attorney’s fees was deemed to be mandatory). 
205. See Hill, supra note 165, at 610 (revealing as an attorney in private practice before the 
development of state statutory frameworks John Hill turned down numerous cases due to the high 
costs associated with litigation). 
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statutory definition.206  To establish consumer status, a plaintiff either has 
to seek or actually acquire goods or services through purchase.207  
Furthermore, the good or service purchased must form the basis of the 
plaintiff’s complaint against the defendant.208  As contemplated by the 
Department of Labor’s regulatory action, for example, the purpose of the 
Fiduciary Rule was to improve the level of service retirement investors 
received by standardizing the financial advice process.209  If aggrieved 
investors are to pursue claims against financial advisors for poor financial 
advice, it will be important for those investors to establish whether the 
advice received constitutes a service under a state deceptive trade practice 
statute. 
The United States District Court for the Southern Division, in Cobb v. 
Miller,210 addressed the issue of when financial advice is considered a 
service.211  Joey Miller conducted investment trading workshops to the 
public on behalf of his company, Traders Edge, Inc., in February 2010.212  
Johnny Cobb paid $25,000 to attend a financial summit and receive financial 
advice on how to trade stock hosted by Miller.213  During the summit, 
Miller made several representations, including that he had a number of years 
of industry experience, option trading was a conservative means of 
investing, and investors could witness large annual returns without risking 
 
206. Section 17.45(4) under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines a consumer as “an 
individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or 
acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services . . . .”  TEX. BUS. & COM. § 17.45(4). 
207. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351–52 (Tex. 1987) (“First, the 
plaintiffs must have sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease.” (citing Sherman Simon 
Enters., Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. 1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garett, Inc, 
618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981))); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539 (defining consumer status as envisioned 
by the Texas statute). 
208. See Barnes, 741 S.W.2d at 352 (“Second, the goods or services purchased or leased must 
form the basis of the complaint.” (citing Sherman Simon Enters., Inc., 724 S.W.2d at 15; Cameron, 
618 S.W.2d at 539)); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539 (holding in order to establish consumer status the 
good purchased needs to form the basis of plaintiff’s complaint). 
209. See Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating 
the intent of the Fiduciary Rule was to eliminate conflicts of interest that may arise in providing 
financial advice). 
210. Cobb v. Miller, No. H–12–1943, 2013 WL 12142342 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013). 
211. See id. at *4 (addressing scenarios when financial advice is assumed to be a service for the 
purpose of establishing consumer status). 
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principal.214  Shortly after the workshop, Miller convinced Cobb to invest 
$500,000 in an options trading strategy.215  Between May and June 2010, 
Cobb communicated he was having difficulty understanding his account 
statements while losing more than $100,000 in his investments.216  Miller 
stated the investment account was performing well; however, by November 
2010, Cobb lost the entire $500,000 balance.217  In June 2012, Cobb filed 
suit against Miller for a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act.218  Miller maintained Cobb could not be a consumer since he received 
advice, which is not to be considered either a good or service.219  The 
district court held that because the advice was purchased, it was the purpose 
of the transaction and could be considered a service under Texas statute.220 
Earlier cases also examined whether financial advice can be viewed as 
service, but from a slightly different perspective.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Munn,221 
addressed if activities in connection with the purchase of an intangible could 
be construed as a service for the purpose of determining consumer 
status.222  Hugh Munn was interested in purchasing stock in a company 
named TIDCO.223  Prior to the purchase, a settlement agreement was 
negotiated with two shareholders, and Munn agreed to guarantee a loan 
issued by Southwest Bank to cover the cost of the agreement.224  TIDCO 
subsequently went bankrupt and Munn brought suit for rescission of the 
guaranty contract.225  Since Texas law does not recognize intangibles as 
goods under its deceptive trade practices statutory framework, Munn would 
have to show he purchased bank services to gain consumer status.226  The 








219. Id. at *3. 
220. Id. at *4 (holding Cobb purchased advice from Miller and can  be considered a consumer). 
221. FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1986). 
222. See id. at 861 (examining whether the guarantor of a loan purchased bank services as a 
consumer under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act). 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 861–62. 
225. Id. at 862. 
226. See id. at 863 (“Since the TIDCO stock and the bank loan are not goods, Munn must 
establish that he purchased ‘services’ to qualify as a consumer.”). 
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objective of a transaction cannot also be considered services.227 
Both Cobb and Munn highlight an important consideration courts will 
examine when determining if a retirement investor has a valid complaint of 
a violation of the Fiduciary Rule: whether the financial advice provided was 
the objective of the transaction or simply incidental in nature.228  As a 
means to make this distinction, courts have two potential options.  First, if 
an investor were to pay for advice from an advisor, a court could find the 
advice was the objective of the transaction, as the advisor was getting 
compensated directly for that advice.229  Evidence of an ongoing fee-based 
relationship for advice or a one-time lump-sum payment would be sufficient 
to establish the advice as the objective of the transaction.  Second, if the 
advice did no more than merely help facilitate the purchase of a product, 
such as a stock or annuity, then that advice would not be viewed as the 
objective.230  Courts would need to find evidence that the result of an 
advisor-investor interaction was one in which the investor purchased a 
product. 
C. The Professional Services Exemption 
An equally problematic issue facing investors who bring suit under a 
deceptive trade practice cause of action is the existence of professional 
services exemptions within the statutory frameworks.231  This exemption 
 
227. See id. at 864 (“We only hold that where those activities are not the subject of the complaint, 
then the presence of such collateral activities in a transaction otherwise not covered by the DTPA does 
not subject the parties to liability under the DTPA.” (quoting Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 
169, 175 n.5 (Tex. 1980))). 
228. See id. (noting not all “activities related to the sale of intangibles” should be considered 
services for purposes of conferring consumer status); Cobb v. Miller, No. H–12–1943, 
2013 WL 12142342, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) (detailing the financial advice purchased by Cobb 
was the objective of the transaction); First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 929 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1993, writ denied) (“[T]he court held that the key principle in determining consumer status is 
that the goods or services purchased must be an objective of the transaction, not merely incidental to it.” 
(citing id. at 865)). 
229. See Cobb, 2013 WL 12142342, at *4 (“Here, Cobb has likewise pleaded that he purchased 
the Miller Defendants’ services for financial and investment advice for the sum of $25,000 . . .  It is 
clear then that the advice that he allegedly purchased forms the basis of his DTPA claim.”). 
230. See Maginn v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no 
writ) (highlighting the services provided by Norwest did nothing more than to help facilitate a 
customer’s purchase of a mortgage loan). 
231. Under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 17.49(c), “Nothing in this subchapter shall 
apply to a claim for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is 
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prevents claims against those who provide advice or opinions as part of a 
professional service.232  It is an affirmative defense that can be pleaded in 
order to defeat a cause of action alleging violations of a deceptive trade 
practices statute.233  For an investor to overcome the use of a professional 
services exemption by a financial advisor, the investor must demonstrate 
any of the following: 1) that a material fact during the rendering of advice 
was misrepresented; 2) there was a failure to disclose information; 3) an 
unconscionable action occurred that cannot be viewed as advice; or 4) an 
express warranty was breached.234  While the burden of proof remains with 
the investor to show one of the previous actions took place, most cases 
regarding the professional services exemption focus on what defines a 
professional service.235 
The Texas Court of Appeals, in Atlantic Lloyd’s Insurance Co. of Texas v. 
Susman Godfrey, LLP,236 reviewed the issue of whether an act by a 
professional constituted a professional service.237  Thomas Adams, an 
attorney representing the law firm of Susman Godfrey, LLP., sent a letter to 
a patient informing her of the firm’s involvement in a prior lawsuit against 
the woman’s physician.238  The law firm was subsequently sued by the 
physician and invoked a duty-to-defend provision in their insurance  




the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill.”  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 17.49(c). 
232. Id.; see Brennan v. Manning, No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Apr. 12, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op) (explaining the definition of a professional services 
exemption). 
233. See Brennan, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (“The professional services exemption is properly 
characterized as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded because it is a plea of confession and 
avoidance.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Head v. U.S. Inspect DFW, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.))). 
234. BUS. & COM. § 17.49(c); see Brennan, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (discussing the various ways 
a consumer may defeat the personal services exemption affirmative defense). 
235. See Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Godfrey, 982 S.W.2d 472, 476–78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1998, pet. denied) (reviewing how professional services should be interpreted for the purpose of a 
defendant to qualify for the exemption); Omni Metals v. Poe & Brown of Tex. Inc., No. 14-00-01081-
CV, 2002 WL 1331720, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 13, 2002, pet. denied) (noting the 
interpretation Texas courts have used to understand the meeting of professional services). 
236. Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., 982 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1998, pet. denied). 
237. See id. at 476–77 (providing a working definition of professional services). 
238. Id. at 473–74. 
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Atlantic).239  Atlantic claimed there was no duty to defend since the duty in 
the insurance policy excluded coverage for any acts related to the rendering 
of professional services.240  The court believed that not every act conducted 
by a professional necessarily should be considered a professional service.241  
In addition, professional services should exclusively include conduct that 
uses certain skills only found in the profession.242 
Regulation BI, coupled with the professional services exemption, 
provides a unique defense for financial advisors against retirement investors.  
It is generally understood that financial advisors provide advice to customers 
on a number of topics, including long-term goals such as retirement 
planning.243  In addition, Regulation BI focuses on recommendations made 
by financial professionals and the scope they are delivered in.244  The public 
perception of an advisor’s job responsibilities and how Regulation BI 
defines the scope of recommendation are strikingly similar to the state 
professional services exemption that focuses on “the essence of which is the 
providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill.”245  
This similarity will allow financial advisors and institutions to argue that any 
level of advice provided should be considered a professional service, thus 
creating an exemption from suit for a violation of the Fiduciary Rule under 
a state statutory framework. 
 
239. Id. at 474. 
240. Id. 
241. See id. at 477 (reviewing acts that may be incidental to a professional’s daily activities (citing 
Bank of Cal., N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
242. See id. (“Professional services are considered those acts which use the inherent skills typified 
by that profession, not all acts associated with the profession.” (emphasis in original) (citing Opie, 
663 F.2d at 981)); see also Brennan v. Manning, No. 07-06-0041-CV, 2007 WL 1098476, at *4 (Tex. 
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243. See How to Choose a Financial Planner, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2008, 12:25 PM), 
http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/managing-your-money/how-to-choose-a-financial-planner/ 
[https://perma.cc/FZ33-94V9] (“Financial planners advise clients on how best to save, invest, and 
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a range of financial matters.”). 
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IX.    CONCLUSION 
How people have planned for their financial future, especially retirement, 
has changed dramatically over the past century.  The model of retirement 
planning has evolved from one in which retirees relied on the government 
for their benefits, to one where the individual is responsible for making 
decisions.  To help facilitate retirement planning decisions, investors have 
turned to a growing field force of financial advisors for guidance.  With the 
growing desire by the investing public to obtain assistance from a 
professional, comes a responsibility by the government to ensure proper 
standards are in place to guard against conflicts of interest. 
The now-vacated Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule and subsequently 
proposed Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation Best Interest are 
positive steps in the right direction of holding financial advisors to the same 
level of accountability as attorneys or accountants.  However,  Regulation 
BI falls short in fully protecting investors when it comes to litigation of their 
claims.  It allows financial professionals and institutions too many 
opportunities to defeat consumer causes of action against them.  In order 
to fully protect investors from improper conduct, the SEC will need to 
revisit the proposed rule during its comment period and provide additional 
measures to ensure to those investors who have been wronged the 
opportunity to fairly prosecute their claims.
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